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Abstract—Smart contracts are applications that execute on
blockchains. Today they manage billions of dollars in value and
motivate visionary plans for pervasive blockchain deployment.
While smart contracts inherit the availability and other secu-
rity assurances of blockchains, however, they are impeded by
blockchains’ lack of confidentiality and poor performance.
We present Ekiden, a system that addresses these critical
gaps by combining blockchains with Trusted Execution Environ-
ments (TEEs). Ekiden leverages a novel architecture that sep-
arates consensus from execution, enabling efficient TEE-backed
confidentiality-preserving smart contracts and high scalability.
Our prototype (with Tendermint as the consensus layer) achieves
example performance of 600x more throughput and 400x less
latency at 1000x less cost than the Ethereum mainnet.
Another contribution of this paper is that we systematically
identify and treat the pitfalls arising from harmonizing TEEs
and blockchains. Treated separately, both TEEs and blockchains
provide powerful guarantees, but hybridized, though, they en-
gender new attacks. For example, in naı¨ve designs, privacy in
TEE-backed contracts can be jeopardized by forgery of blocks, a
seemingly unrelated attack vector. We believe the insights learned
from Ekiden will prove to be of broad importance in hybridized
TEE-blockchain systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Smart contracts are protocols that digitally enforce agree-
ments between or among distrusting parties. Typically execut-
ing on blockchains, they enforce trust through strong integrity
assurance: Even the creator of a smart contract cannot feasibly
modify its code or subvert its execution. Smart contracts
have been proposed to improve applications across a range of
industries, including finance, insurance, identity management,
and supply chain management.
Smart contracts inherit some undesirable blockchain proper-
ties. To enable validation of state transitions during consensus,
blockchain data is public. Existing smart contract systems thus
lack confidentiality or privacy: They cannot safely store or
compute on sensitive data (e.g., auction bids, financial transac-
tions). Blockchain consensus requirements also hamper smart
contracts with poor performance in terms of computational
power, storage capacity, and transaction throughput. Ethereum,
the most popular decentralized smart contract platform, is used
almost exclusively today for technically simple applications
such as tokens, and can incur costs vastly (eight orders of mag-
nitude) more than ordinary cloud-computing environments. In
short, the application complexity of smart contracts today is
highly constrained. Without critical performance and confi-
dentiality improvements, smart contracts may fail to deliver
on their transformative promise.
Researchers have explored cryptographic solutions to these
challenges, such as various zero-knowledge proof systems [41]
and secure multiparty computation [81]. However, these ap-
proaches have significant performance overhead and are only
applicable to limited use cases with relatively simple compu-
tations. A more performant and general-purpose option is use
of a trusted execution environment (TEE).
A TEE provides a fully isolated environment that prevents
other software applications, the operating system, and the host
owner from tampering with or even learning the state of an
application running in the TEE. For example, Intel Software
Guard eXtensions (SGX) provides an implementation of a
TEE. The Keystone-enclave project [4] aims to provide an
open-source TEE design.
A key observation driving our system design is that TEEs
and blockchains have complementary properties. On the one
hand, a blockchain can guarantee strong availability and
persistence of its state, whereas a TEE cannot guarantee
availability (as the host can terminate TEEs at its discretion),
nor can it reliably access the network or persistent storage.
On the flip side, a blockchain has very limited computation
power, and must expose its entire state for public verification,
whereas a TEE incurs minimal overhead compared with native
computation, and offers verifiable computation with confiden-
tial state via remote attestation. Thus it appears appealing to
build hybrid protocols that take advantage of both.
Harmonizing TEEs with blockchains, though, is a challenge.
Subtle pitfalls arise when the two are naı¨vely glued together.
One such pitfall arises from a fundamental limitation of
TEEs: A malicious host can arbitrarily manipulate their
scheduling and I/O. Consequently, TEEs might terminate
at any point, posing the risk and challenge of lost and/or
conflicting state. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that
the so-called trusted timer in TEEs (SGX, in particular) can in
fact only provide a “no-earlier-than” notion of time, because
a malicious host can also delay the clock read (a message
transmitted over the bus). Thus, while it’s tempting to use a
blockchain to checkpoint a TEE’s state (e.g. [40]), the lack
of a reliable timer renders it tricky for a TEE to ascertain
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an up-to-date view of the blockchain. As we’ll show later,
naı¨ve state-checkpointing protocols open up rewinding attacks
(Section III). Another interesting and dangerous consequence
is that seemingly unrelated attack vectors come into play. For
example, the confidentiality of TEE-protected content could
be jeopardized by integrity attacks against the blockchain:
e.g., an attacker could circumvent a privacy budget enforced
by a TEE by providing a forged blockchain to rewind its
execution and sent it arbitrarily many queries. Other challenges
include tolerating compromised TEEs, supporting robust and
consistent failover when TEEs crash, and key management for
enclaves. We systematically identify and treat each of these
pitfalls in this paper.
Following the above design principles, we present Ekiden,
a system for highly performant and confidentiality-preserving
smart contracts. To the best of our knowledge, Ekiden is
the first confidentiality-preserving smart contract system ca-
pable of thousands of transactions per second. The key to
this achievement is a secure and principled combination of
blockchains and trusted hardware. Ekiden combines any de-
sired underlying blockchain system (permissioned or permis-
sionless) with TEE-based execution. Anchored in a formal
security model expressed as a cryptographic ideal functional-
ity [17], Ekiden’s principled design supports rigorous analysis
of its security properties.
Ekiden adopts an architecture where computation is sepa-
rated from consensus. Ekiden uses compute nodes to perform
smart contract computation over private data off chain in
TEEs, then attest to their correct execution on chain. The
underlying blockchain is maintained by consensus nodes,
which need not use trusted hardware. Ekiden is agnostic
to consensus-layer mechanics, only requiring a blockchain
capable of validating remote attestations from compute nodes.
Ekiden can thus scale consensus and compute nodes indepen-
dently according to performance and security needs.
By operating compute nodes in TEEs, Ekiden imposes
minimal performance overhead relative to an ordinary (e.g.,
cloud) computing environment. In this way, we avoid the
computational burden and latency of on-chain execution. TEE-
based computation in Ekiden provides confidentiality, enabling
efficient use of powerful cryptographic primitives that a TEE
is known to emulate, such as functional encryption [29] and
black-box obfuscation [58], and also provides a trustworthy
source of randomness, a major acknowledged difficulty in
blockchain systems [16].
To address the availability and network security limitations
of TEEs, Ekiden supports on-chain checkpointing and (op-
tional) storage of contract state. Ekiden thereby supports safe
interaction among long-lived smart contracts across different
trust domains. To address potential TEE failures, such as side
channel attacks, we propose mitigations to preserve integrity
and limit data leakage (Section III-A). Assuming blockchain
integrity, users need not trust smart contract creators, min-
ers, node operators or any other entity for liveness, persis-
tence, confidentiality, or correctness. Ekiden thus enables self-
sustaining services that can outlive any single node, user, or
development effort.1
Technical challenges and contributions. Our work on Ekiden
addresses several key technical challenges:
• Formal security modeling: While intuitively clear, the
desired and achievable security properties required for
Ekiden are challenging to define formally. We express the
full range of security requirements of Ekiden in terms
of an ideal functionality FEkiden. We outline a security
proof in the Universal Composability (UC) framework
that shows that the Ekiden protocol matches FEkiden under
concurrent composition.
• A principled approach for hybridized TEE-blockchain
systems: We systematically enumerate the fundamental
pitfalls arising from fusing blockchains and TEEs and
offer general techniques for overcoming them. Further,
we show that by appealing to cryptographic ideal func-
tionalities, these techniques can be applied in a principled,
provably secure, and performant way that we believe
can be generalized to a broad range of hybridized TEE-
blockchain systems.
• Performance: The blockchain is likely to be a perfor-
mance bottleneck of a TEE-blockchain hybrid system. We
provide optimization that minimize the use of blockchain
without degrading security: We show that they realize the
same FEkiden functionality as the unoptimized protocol.
Evaluation. We evaluate the performance of Ekiden on a
suite of applications that exercise the full range of system
resources and demonstrate how Ekiden enables application
deployment that would otherwise be impractical due to pri-
vacy and/or performance concerns. They include a machine
learning framework, within which we implement medical-
diagnosis and credit-scoring applications, a smart building
thermal model, and a poker game. We also port an Ethereum
Virtual Machine implementation to Ekiden, so that existing
contracts (e.g., written in Solidity), such as Cryptokitties [1]
and the ERC20 token, can run in our framework as well. We
report on development effort, showing that the programming
model in Ekiden lends itself to simple and intuitive application
development. Contracts in Ekiden process transactions 2–
3 orders of magnitude both faster and higher throughput
over Ethereum. Our performance optimizations also greatly
compress the amount of data stored on the blockchain, yielding
a 2–4 order of magnitude improvement over the baseline. (The
advantage is greater for read-write operations on contracts with
large state, such as our token contract.)
II. BACKGROUND
a) Smart Contracts and Blockchains: Blockchain-based
smart contracts are programs executed by a network of partic-
ipants who reach agreement on the programs’ state. Existing
smart contract systems replicate data and computation on all
nodes in the system. so that individual node can verify correct
execution of the contract. Full replication on all nodes provides
1Our system name Ekiden refers to this property. “Ekiden” is a Japanese
term for a long-distance relay running race.
a high level of fault tolerance and availability. Smart contract
systems such as Ethereum [27] has demonstrated their utility
across a range of applications.
However, several critical limitations impede wider adoption
of current smart contract systems. First, on-chain computation
of fully replicated smart contracts is inherently expensive. For
example in August 2017, it cost $26.55 to add 2 numbers
together one million times in an Ethereum smart contract [27],
a cost roughly 8 orders of magnitude higher than in AWS
EC2 [66]. Furthermore, current systems offer no privacy
guarantees. Users are identified by pseudonyms. As numerous
studies have shown [64], [53], [56], [65], pseudonymity pro-
vides only weak privacy protection. Moreover, contract state
and user input must be public in order for miners to verify
correct computation. Lack of privacy fundamentally restricts
the scope of applications of smart contracts.
b) Trusted Hardware with Attestation: A key building
block of Ekiden is a trusted execution environment (TEE)
that protects the confidentiality and integrity of computations,
and can issue proofs, known as attestations, of computation
correctness. Ekiden is implemented with Intel SGX [5], [34],
[52], a specific TEE technology, but we emphasize that it
may use any comparable TEE with attestation capabilities,
such as the ongoing effort Keystone-enclave [4] aiming to
realize open-source secure hardware enclave. We now offer
brief background on TEEs, with a focus on Intel SGX.
Intel SGX provides a CPU-based implementation of
TEEs—known as enclaves in SGX—for general-purpose com-
putation. A host can instantiate multiple TEEs, which are not
only isolated from each other, but also from the host. Code
running inside a TEE has a protected address space. When data
from a TEE moves off the processor to memory, it is trans-
parently encrypted with keys only available to the processor.
Thus the operating system, hypervisor, and other users cannot
access the enclave’s memory. The SGX memory encryption
engine also guarantees data integrity and prevents memory
replay attacks [32]. Intel SGX supports attested execution,
i.e., it is able to prove the correct execution of a program,
by issuing a remote attestation, a digital signature, using a
private key known only to the hardware, over the program
and an execution output. Remote attestation also allows remote
users to establish encrypted and authenticated channels to an
enclave [5]. Assuming trust in the hardware, and Intel, which
authenticates attestation keys, it is infeasible for any entity
other than an SGX platform to generate any attestation, i.e.,
attestations are existentially unforgeable.
However, attested execution realized by trusted hardware
isn’t perfect. For example, SGX alone cannot guarantee
availability: a malicious host can terminate enclaves or drop
messages arbitrarily. Even an honest host could accidentally
lose state (e.g. when power cycles). The weak availability of
SGX poses a fundamental challenge to the design of Ekiden.
Also, the current SGX implementation is vulnerable to side-
channel attacks [77], [60]. Ekiden is compatible with existing
defenses [13], [58], [48], [75], [63]. We discuss side-channel
resistance in Section III-A.
III. TECHNICAL CHALLENGES IN TEE-BLOCKCHAIN
HYBRID SYSTEMS
Before diving into the specifics of Ekiden, we first describe
and address the fundamental pitfalls that arise when harmo-
nizing TEEs and blockchains. The solutions serve as building
blocks of the Ekiden protocol, and we believe the insights
learned from Ekiden will prove to be of broad importance in
hybridized TEE-blockchain systems.
A. Tolerating TEE failures
Although designed to execute general purpose programs,
trusted hardware is not a panacea. Here we analyze the lim-
itations of TEEs and their impact on TEE-blockchain hybrid
protocols.
a) Availability failures: Trusted hardware in general can-
not ensure availability. In the case of SGX, a malicious host
can terminate enclaves, and even an honest host could lose
enclaves in a power cycle. A TEE-blockchain system must
tolerate such host failures, ensuring that crashed TEEs can at
most delay execution.
Our high-level approach is to treat TEEs as expendable
and interchangeable, relying on the blockchain to resolve
any conflicts resulting from concurrency. To ensure that any
particular TEE is easily replaced, TEEs are stateless, and
any persistent state is stored by the blockchain. We discuss
later how TEEs can also keep soft state across invocations
as a performance optimization, but we emphasize that the
techniques in Ekiden ensure that losing such state at any point
does not affect security.
b) Side channels: Although TEEs aim to protect confi-
dentiality, recent work has uncovered data leakage via side-
channel attacks. Existing defenses are generally application-
and attack-specific (e.g., crypto libraries avoid certain data-
dependent operations [13]); generalizing such protections re-
mains challenging. Thus, Ekiden largely defers protections to
the application developer.
Even though there is perhaps no definitive and practical
panacea to all side-channel attacks, it is still desirable to limit
the impact of compromised TEEs and provide graceful degra-
dation in the face of small-scale compromise. Our approach is
to compartmentalize both spatially and temporally. We design
critical components in Ekiden, such as the key manager,
against a strong adversarial model, allowing an attacker to
break the confidentiality of a small fraction of TEEs, and limit
the access to the key manager from other components. We also
employ proactive key rotation [33] to confine the purview of a
leaked key. Key management is fundamental to the availability
of a TEE-blockchain system, as discussed below.
c) Timer failures: TEEs in general lack trusted time
sources. In the case of SGX, although a trusted relative timer is
available, the communication between enclaves and the timer
(provided by an off-CPU component) can be delayed by the
OS [38], [37]. Moreover server-grade Intel CPUs offer no
support for SGX timers at the time of writing. Thus a TEE-
blockchain hybrid protocol must minimize reliance on the TEE
timer.
Our approach is to design protocols that do not require TEEs
to have a current view of a blockchain. Specifically, instead
of requiring a TEE to distinguish stale state from current
state (without a synchronized clock, there is no definitive
countermeasure to a network adversary delaying messages
from the blockchain), our techniques rely on the blockchain
to proactively reject any update based on a stale input state (a
hash of which is included in the update).
The missing timer also makes it hard for TEEs to verify
that an item has been persisted in the blockchain, i.e. to
establish “proofs of publication,” as coined by [40]. However
[40] doesn’t consider threats caused by lack of trustworthy
time in TEEs—e.g., injection of old, fake, easily minable
blocks—that are critical in PoW-based blockchains. One of
our contributions is a general, time-based proof-of-publication
protocol that is secure against network adversary delaying
clock read, as we now briefly explain.
B. Proof of Publication for PoW blockchains
In order to leverage blockchains as persistent storage, a TEE
must be able to efficiently verify that an item has been stored
in the blockchain. For permissioned blockchains, such a proof
can consist of signatures from a quorum of consensus nodes.
To establish proofs of publication for PoW-based blockchains,
TEEs must be able to validate new blocks. As noted in [21], a
trusted timer is needed to defend against an adversary isolating
an enclave and presenting an invalid subchain. Unfortunately,
timing sources over secure channels (e.g. SGX timers) cannot
guarantee a bounded response time, as discussed above. To
work around this limitation, we leverage the confidentiality of
TEEs so that an attacker delaying a timer’s responses cannot
prevent an enclave from successfully verifying blockchain
contents. Our solution can even work without SGX timers
given trust in, e.g. TLS-enabled NTP servers. Due to lack of
space, we relegate our proof-of-publication protocol for PoW
blockchains to Section V-A.
C. Key management in TEEs
A fundamental limitation of using a blockchain to persist
TEE state is the lack of confidentiality. We showed previously
how to avoid this problem by encryption. This, however, leads
to another problem: how can one persist the encryption keys?
Generally the method is to replicate keys across multiple
TEEs. However, the flip side is the challenge of minimizing the
key exfiltration risk in the face of confidentiality breach (e.g.
via side-channel attacks). There is in general a fundamental
tension between exposure risk and availability: A higher
replication factor means not only better resiliency to state loss,
but also a larger attack surface. Therefore the tradeoff and
achievable properties would depend on the threat model.
Since there is perhaps no definitive and practical full-
system side-channel mitigation, our approach is to design the
key manager against a stronger adversarial model where the
attacker is allowed to break the confidentiality of a small
fraction of TEEs, and limit the access from other components.
We outline the key management protocol in Section V-B.
D. Atomic delivery of execution results
In blockchain systems, ensuring the atomicity of executions,
namely either both executions e1, e2 finish or none of them,
has been a fundamental problem, as exemplified by work on
atomic cross-chain swaps [10]. A similar but more complicated
problem arises in TEE-blockchain hybridization.
For a general stateful TEE-blockchain protocol, TEE ex-
ecution yields two messages: m1, which delivers the output
to the caller, and m2, which delivers the state update to the
blockchain, both via adversarial channels. We emphasize that
it is critical to enforce atomic delivery of the two messages,
i.e. both m1 and m2 are delivered or the system has become
permanently unavailable. m1 is delivered when the caller
receives it. The new state m2 is delivered once accepted by the
blockchain. Rejected state update are not considered delivered.
To see the necessity of atomic delivery, consider possible
attacks when it’s violated, i.e., when only one of the two
messages is delivered. First, if only the output m1 is delivered,
a rewind attack becomes possible. Since TEE cannot tell
whether an input state is fresh, an attacker can provide stale
states to resume a TEE’s execution from an old state. This
enables grinding attacks against randomized TEE programs.
An attacker may repeatedly rewind until receiving the desired
output. Another example is that rewinding could defeat budget-
based privacy protection, such as differential privacy. On the
other hand, if only the state update m2 is delivered, the user
risks permanent loss of the output, as it might be impossible
to reproduce the same output with the updated state.
We specify the atomic delivery protocol in Section V-C.
IV. OVERVIEW OF EKIDEN
In this section, we provide an overview of the design and
security properties of Ekiden.
A. Motivation
As an example to motivate our work, consider a credit
scoring application—an example we implement and report
on in Section VII-A. Credit scores are widely used by
lenders, insurers, and others to evaluate the creditworthi-
ness of consumers. Despite its considerable revenue ($10.8B
in 2017 [36]), the credit reporting industry in the U.S. is
concentrated among a handful of credit bureaus [36]. Such
centralization creates large single points of failure and other
problems, as highlighted by a recent data breach affecting
nearly half the US population [12].
Blockchain-based decentralized credit scoring is thus an
attractive and popular alternative. Bloom [45], for example,
is a startup offering a credit scoring system on Ethereum.
Their scheme, however, only supports a static credit scoring
algorithm that omits important private data and cannot support
predictive modeling. Such applications are bedeviled by two
critical limitations of current smart contract systems: (1) A
lack of data confidentiality needed to protect sensitive con-
sumer records (e.g., loan-service history for credit scoring)
and the proprietary prediction models derived from them and
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Fig. 1. Overview of Ekiden architecture and workflow. Clients send inputs to
confidentiality-preserving smart contracts, which are executed within a TEE
at any compute node. The blockchain stores encrypted contract state. See
Section IV-B for an overview.
(2) A failure to achieve the high performance needed to handle
global workloads.
To support large-scale, privacy-sensitive applications like
credit scoring, it is essential to meet these two requirements
while preserving the integrity and availability offered by
blockchains—all without requiring a trusted third party. Eki-
den offers a confidential, trustworthy, and performant platform
that achieves precisely this goal for smart contract execution.
B. Ekiden Overview
Conceptually, Ekiden realizes a secure execution environ-
ment for rich user-defined smart contracts. An Ekiden contract
is a deterministic stateful program. Without loss of generality,
we assume contract programs take the form (outp, stnew) :=
Contract(stold, inp), ingesting as input a previous state stold
and a client’s input inp, and generating an output outp and
new state stnew.
Once deployed on Ekiden, smart contracts are endowed with
strong confidentiality, integrity and availability guarantees.
Ekiden achieves these properties with a hybrid architecture
combining trusted hardware and the blockchain. Figure 1
depicts the architecture of Ekiden and a workflow of Ekiden
smart contracts. As it shows, there are three types of entities
in Ekiden: clients, compute nodes and consensus nodes.
• Clients are end users of smart contracts. In Ekiden, a
client can create contracts or execute existing ones with
secret input. In either case, clients delegate computation to
compute nodes (discussed below). We expect clients to be
lightweight, allowing both mobile and web applications to
interact with contracts.
• Compute nodes process requests from clients by running
the contract in a contract TEE and generating attestations
proving the correctness of state updates. Anyone with a
TEE-enabled platform can participate as a compute node,
contributing to the liveness and scalability of the system.
A quorum of compute nodes form a key management
committee and run a distributed protocol to manage keys
used by contract TEEs. A contract TEE reaches out to the
key management committee to create or retrieve keys. We
defer details of key management to Section V-B.
• Consensus nodes maintain a distributed append-only
ledger, i.e. a blockchain, by running a consensus proto-
col. Contract state and attestations are persisted on this
blockchain. Consensus nodes are responsible for checking
the validity of state updates using TEE attestations, as we
discuss below.
C. Workflow
We now sketch the contract creation and request execution
workflow, providing further details on Figure 1. The detailed
formal protocol is presented in Section VI-B.
For simplicity, we assume a client has a priority list of com-
pute nodes to use. In practice, a coordinator can be employed
to facilitate compute node discovery and load balancing. We
denote a client as P and a compute node as Comp.
a) Contract creation: When creating a contract, P sends
a piece of contract code Contract to Comp. Comp loads
Contract into a TEE (called contract TEE hereafter), and starts
the initialization. The contract TEE creates a fresh contract id
cid, obtains fresh (pkincid, sk
in
cid) pair and k
state
cid from the key man-
agement committee and generates an encrypted initial state
Enc(kstatecid ,
~0) and an attestation σTEE, proving the correctness
of initialization and that pkincid is the corresponding public key
for contract cid. Finally, Comp obtains a proof of the cor-
rectness of σTEE by contacting the attestation service (detailed
below); this proof and σTEE are bundled into a “certified” attes-
tation pi. Comp then sends (Contract, pkincid,Enc(k
state
cid ,
~0), pi)
to consensus nodes. The full protocol for contract creation is
specified in the “create” call of ProtEkiden (Fig. 2). Consensus
nodes verify pi before accepting Contract, the encrypted initial
state, and pkincid as valid and placing it on the blockchain.
b) Request execution: The steps of request execution
illustrated in Fig. 1 are as follows:
(1) To initiate the process of executing a contract cid with
input inp, P first obtains pkincid associated with the contract
cid from the blockchain, computes inpct = Enc(pk
in
cid, inp)
and sends to Comp a message (cid, inpct), as specified in
Lines 8-11 of ProtEkiden.
(2) Comp retrieves the contract code and the encrypted pre-
vious state stct = Enc(kstatecid , stold) of contract cid, from the
blockchain, and loads stct and inpct into a TEE and starts
the execution, as specified in Line 30-33 of ProtEkiden.
(3-4) From the key management committee, the contract TEE
obtains kstatecid and sk
in
cid, with which it decrypts stct and inpct
and executes, generating an output outp, a new encrypted
state st′ct = Enc(k
state
cid , stnew), and an signature pi proving
correct computation, as specified in Line 7-13 of the TEE
Wrapper (Fig. 9).
(5a, 5b) Finally, Comp and P conduct an atomic delivery
protocol which delivers outp to P and (st′ct, pi) to the
consensus nodes. We defer the detail of atomic delivery
to Section V-C. Briefly, Step 5a and Step 5b in Fig. 1
are executed atomically, i.e. outp is revealed to P if and
only if (st′ct, pi) is accepted by consensus nodes. Consensus
nodes verify pi before accepting the new state as valid and
placing it on the blockchain.
A key distinction between Ekiden and existing smart con-
tract platforms (e.g. Ethereum [27]) is Ekiden decouples
request execution from consensus. In Ethereum, request ex-
ecution is replicated by all nodes in the network to reach
consensus, rendering the entire network as slow as a single
node. Whereas in Ekiden, request is only executed by K
compute nodes for some small K (e.g. in Figure 1, we set
K = 1) and consensus nodes just verify K proofs of correct
execution without repeating the execution.
In our implementation, a proof of correct execution takes
the form of a signature pi. Specifically, a compute node Comp
obtains pi as follows. Suppose the execution on Comp results
in an output st′ct and an attestation σTEE (a signature [15] over
the contract code and st′ct). Comp then sends σTEE to the Intel
Attestation Service (IAS), which verifies σTEE and replies with
pi = (b, σTEE, σIAS), where b ∈ {0, 1} indicates the validity of
σTEE and σIAS is a signature over b and σTEE by IAS. pi is then
submitted to consensus node as a proof of correctness for st′ct.
As pi is just a signature, consensus nodes need neither trusted
hardware nor to contact the IAS to verify it.
D. Ekiden Security Goals
Here we summarize the security goals of Ekiden. Briefly,
Ekiden aims to support execution of general-purpose contracts
while enforcing the following security properties:
Correct execution: Contract state transitions reflect correct
execution of contract code on given state and inputs.
Consistency: At any time, the blockchain stores a single
sequence of state transitions consistent with the view of
each compute node.
Secrecy: During a period without any TEE breach, Ekiden
guarantees that contract state and inputs from honest
clients are kept secret from all other parties. Additionally,
Ekiden is resilient to some key-manager TEEs being
breached.
Graceful confidentiality degradation: Should a confiden-
tiality breach occur in a computation node (as opposed to a
key-manager node), Ekiden provides forward secrecy and
reasonable isolation from the affected TEEs. Specifically,
suppose a confidentiality breach happens at t. The attacker
can at most access the history up to t −∆ where ∆ is a
system parameter. Moreover, a compromised TEE can only
affect a subset of contracts.
Non-goals: Ekiden does not prevent contract-level leakage
(e.g. through covert channels, bugs or side channels). Thus
contract developers are responsible for ensuring that no secret
is revealed through public output, and that the contract is free
of bugs and side channels. We discuss supported mitigation in
Section VI-D.
E. Assumptions and Threat Model
a) TEE: Recent work demonstrates that the confidential-
ity of SGX enclaves may be compromised via side-channel
attacks. In light of this threat, we assume the adversary can
compromise the confidentiality of a small fraction of TEEs.
As noted above, the impact depends on whether the breaches
affect key-manager or computation nodes. We assume that
TEE hardware is otherwise correctly implemented and se-
curely manufactured.
b) Blockchain: Ekiden is designed to be agnostic to
the underlying consensus protocol. It can be deployed atop
any blockchain implementation as long as the requirements
specified below are met.
We assume the blockchain will perform prescribed compu-
tation correctly and is always available. In particular, Ekiden
relies on consensus nodes to verify attestations. We further
assume the blockchain provides an efficient way to construct
proofs of item inclusion on the blockchain, i.e., proofs of
publication, as discussed in Section III-B.
c) Threat Model: All parties in the system must trust
Ekiden and TEE. We assume the adversary can control the
operating system and the network stack of all but one com-
pute nodes. On controlled nodes, the adversary can reorder
messages and schedule processes arbitrarily. We assume the
attacker can compromise the confidentiality of a small fraction
(e.g. f%) of TEEs. The adversary observes global network
traffic and may reorder and delay messages arbitrarily.
The adversary may corrupt any number of clients. Clients
need not execute contracts themselves and do not require
trusted hardware. We assume honest clients trust their own
code and platform, but not other clients. Each contract has an
explicit policy dictating how data is processed and requests
are serviced. Ekiden does not (and cannot reasonably) prevent
contracts from leaking secrets intentionally or unintentionally
through software bugs.
V. BUILDING BLOCKS
Before diving to protocol details, we first present key
building blocks of the Ekiden protocol, addressing the general
technical challenges in TEE-blockchain systems, as reviewed
in Section III.
A. Proof of Publication
We now present a proof of publication protocol for per-
missionless blockchains. Please refer to Section III-B for
background and motivation. A proof of publication is an
interactive proof between a verifier E , in the form of a contract
TEE, and a untrusted prover P . The high level idea is to only
give P a limited amount of time to publish the message in
a block within a subchain of sufficient difficulty so that an
adversary cannot feasibly forge it. The protocol is formally
specified in Fig. 10. We give text description below so the
formal specification is not required for understanding.
E stores a recent checkpoint block CB from the blockchain,
from which a difficulty δ(CB), e.g. the number of leading
zeroes in the block nonce, can be calculated. E will emit an
(attested) version of CB to any requesting client, enabling the
client to verify CB’s freshness. Given a valid recent CB, E
can verify new blocks based on δ(CB), assuming the difficulty
is relatively stationary. (For simplicity in our analysis here, we
assume constant difficulty, but our analysis can be extended
under an assumption of bounded difficulty variations.)
To initiate publication of m, E calls the timer to get a
timestamp t1. As discussed, E may receive t1 after a delay.
After receiving t1 (maybe at a time later than t1), E generates
a random nonce r and requires the prover to publish (m, r).
Upon receiving a proof pi(m,r) (a subchain containing (m, r))
from P , E calls the timer again for t2. Let nc to be the number
of confirmations in (m, r), τ be the expected block interval
(an invariant of the blockchain), and  be a multiplicative
slack factor that accounts for variation in the time to generate
blocks, which is a stochastic process. E.g.,  = 1.5 means that
production of pi(m,r) is allowed to be up to 1.5 times slower
than expected on the main chain. E accepts pi(m,r) only if
t2 − t1 < nc × τ × .
Setting  to a high value reduces the probability of false
rejections (i.e., rejecting proofs from an honest P when the
main chain growth was unluckily slow during some time-
frame). However, a high  also increases the possibility of false
acceptance, i.e. accepting a forged subchain. For any  > 1, it
is possible to require a large enough nc so that the probability
of a successful attack becomes negligible. However, a large nc
means that an honest P needs to wait for a long time before
P can obtain the output, may affecting the user experience.
For example, for a powerful attacker with 25% hash power
(roughly the largest mining pool known to exist in Bitcoin
and Ethereum at the time of writing), setting nc = 80 and
 = 1.6 means the attacker needs an expected 2112 hashes to
forge a proof of publication2, while an honest proof will be
rejected with probability 2−19. Similar block-synchronization
techniques and analysis are used in the recently proposed
Tesseract TEE-based cryptocurrency exchange [10].
It is easy to see that delaying the timer’s responses does not
give the attacker more time than t2 − t1. Delaying timestamp
t1 shrinks this apparent interval of time, disadvantaging the
attacker. E’s checkpoint block can be updated with the same
protocol, by publishing an empty message. Note that once a
message is successfully published by a TEE, other TEEs can
obtain the proof via secure channels established by attestations,
saving the cost of repeating the protocol.
B. Key Management
Each Ekiden contract is associated with a set of keys,
including a symmetric key for state encryption and a key
pair to encrypt client input. Here we discuss the generation,
distribution, and rotation of these keys.
1) Adversarial model: We consider a adversary that can
break the confidentiality, e.g., via side-channel attacks, of some
fraction (e.g. f%) of the TEEs. The exact value of f depends
on the deployment and enrollment model. f can be a very
2as the time of writing, it takes roughly 273 hashes to mine a Bitcoin block.
low value if enrollment is limited to well-managed nodes,
e.g., ones hosted by capable and reputable organizations. But
when deployed in a more open environment, f needs to be
reasonably high. We assume the participating hosts have (at
least partially) Sybil-resistant identities. One way to achieve
this is to require a security deposit to join the protocol.
In addition, we assume there are sufficiently many (e.g.
more than 2f% of) participants online at any time so that
the availability of keys are retained. In practice, participation
can be motivated by economic rewards and penalties. We leave
the incentive design for future work.
2) Desired properties: Since decryption keys are even-
tually revealed to a contract TEE, which itself may also
be compromised, actively used keys (i.e. hot keys) must
be short-live, derived from a less-exposed long-term master
secret. Ideally, a key management protocol should satisfy the
following properties:
• Confidentiality: The adversary (within our model) cannot
exfiltrate the long-term master key.
• Availability: An honest contract TEE can always access
decryption keys.
• Forward secrecy: If a short-term key is compromised at time
t, it cannot be used to decrypt messages encrypted before
t−∆, for some system parameter ∆.
3) Preliminaries: Below we outline a key management pro-
tocol that satisfies the above requirements. We first review the
building blocks, including distributed key generation (DKG)
protocols and distributed pseudo-random functions (PRFs).
a) Distributed Key Generation (DKG): A DKG protocol
(e.g. [30]) allows a set of N parties to generate unbiased,
random keys. The outcome of a run of a DKG protocol is
a secret s, but shared among parties using a secret-sharing
scheme (typically Shamir’s).
b) Distributed PRF: Informally, a PRF is a collection of
functions F = {fs}s∈S , such that for a random index s←$S,
fs(·) is indistinguishable from a random function.
Naor et al. [57] introduce distributed PRFs, which are
such that parties with shares of s can evaluate fs(·) without
reconstructing s. Specifically, let G be a Schnorr group and g
be a generator. Let H : {0, 1}∗ → G be a hash function, [57]
shows that fs(x) = H(x)s is a family of PRF.
Suppose s is shared among parties using a (k, n)-secret
sharing scheme. To evaluate fs(x), party i simply computes
and outputs yi = H(x)si , computed with its share si. After
collecting at least k + 1 of {yi}, one can derive fs(x) by
polynomial interpolation in the exponent:
fs(x) = H(x)
S = H(x)
∑
i∈A Siλi =
∏
i∈A
yλii
where λi are Lagrange coefficients λi =
∏
j 6=i
−j
i−j .
4) Protocol:
a) Key management committees and long-term keys:
Assuming Sybil-resistant identities, we can sample N nodes
from the participants to form a key management committee
(KMC). N is a system parameter. When initializing a contract
c, KMC runs the DKG protocol to generate a long term key
kc, so that kc is secret-shared among KMC members using a
(dfNe , N)-secret sharing scheme. Previous work on proactive
secret sharing (e.g. [33], [68]) can be used to periodically
rotate the committee without changing the secret. [68] also
allows a committee to be dynamically expanded.
b) Generating short-term keys: Suppose short-term keys
expire every epoch. To get the short-term key for contract
c at epoch t, a compute node Comp first establishes secure
channels and authenticates itself with members in KMC. Once
verified that Comp is indeed executing c, each KMC member
i computes kc,t,i = H(t)k
i
c and sends kc,t,i to Comp. After
collecting f + 1 outcomes from A ⊆ KMC, Comp can
construct the short-term key for epoch t by kc,t =
∏
i∈A k
λi
c,t,i
where λi are Lagrange coefficients.
c) Breach isolation: We proactively quarantine confiden-
tiality breaches by enforcing a privacy budget for each com-
pute node. For this to work, we assume contract TEEs have
unforgeable host identities (e.g., the linkable EPID public key
in SGX provides one). Key-manager nodes maintain a counter
κComp for each compute node Comp to record the number of
queries. The counter is reset along with epoch advancement.
Key-manager nodes fulfill a query only if κComp < κ for some
system parameter κ. With this in place, no matter how many
TEEs a breached compute node spawns, it can at most obtain
κ keys. In practice, requests to a depleted honest compute node
can be redirected to other nodes, resulting in only a modest
overhead.
C. Atomic Delivery
Recall that TEE execution yields two messages: m1, which
delivers the output to the caller, and m2, which delivers the
state update to the blockchain, both via adversarial channels.
As discussed in Section III-D, it is critical to enforce atomic
delivery of the two messages, i.e. both m1 and m2 are
delivered or the system has become permanently unavailable.
Now we specify a protocol for atomic delivery.
Assuming a secure communication channel between a TEE
and the calling client P (which in practice can be constructed
with remote attestation), we realize atomic delivery of m1 and
m2 (defined above) via the following two-phase protocol: To
initiate atomic delivery, TEE obtains a fresh key k from the
key manager and sends an attested mc1 = Enc(k,m1) to P
over a secure channel. Once P acknowledges receipt of mc1,
the TEE sends m2 to the blockchain. Finally, after seeing pim2 ,
a proof of publication for m2, TEE sends k to P .
The above protocol realizes atomic delivery. On the one
hand, as a TEE can ascertain the delivery of m2 by verifying
pim2 , k is revealed only if m2 is delivered. On the other hand,
if m2 has been delivered, k will be released eventually because
at least one TEE is available and the key management protocol
ensures that the availability of k.
VI. PROTOCOL DETAILS AND SECURITY PROOF
In this section, we specify ProtEkiden, the protocol realiza-
tion of Ekiden. It aims to realize a Universal Composability
(UC) [17] ideal functionality FEkiden that we defer to Ap-
pendix A for lack of space and encourage the reader to consult.
Looking ahead, ProtEkiden UC-realizes FEkiden.
A. Preliminary and Notation
a) Attested Execution: To formally model attested ex-
ecution on trusted hardware, we adopt the ideal function-
ality Gatt defined in [62]. Informally, a party first loads a
program prog into a TEE with an “install” message. On
a “resume” call, the program is run on the given input,
generating an output outp along with an attestation σTEE =
ΣTEE.Sig(skTEE, (prog, outp)), a signature under a hardware
key skTEE. The public key pkTEE can be obtained from
Gatt.getpk(). See [62] for details.
In practice it’s useful to allow a TEE to output data
that is not included in attestation. We extend Gatt slightly
to allow this: if a TEE program prog generates a pair of
output (outp1, outp2), the attestation only signs outp1, i.e.
σTEE = ΣTEE.Sig(skTEE, (prog, outp1)). A common pattern is
to include a hash of outp2 in outp1, to allow parties to verify
σTEE and outp2 separately. Similar technique is used in [78].
Following the notation in [41], [75], we use contract wrap-
pers (defined in Fig. 9) to abstract away routine functionality
such as state encryption, key management, etc. A contract c
augmented with the wrapper is denoted ĉ.
b) Blockchain: Fblockchain[succ] (given in Appendix A)
defines a general-purpose append-only ledger implemented by
common blockchain protocols (formally defined in Figure 7 in
the Appendix). The parameter succ is a function that specifies
the criteria for a new item to be added to the storage, modeling
the notion of transaction validity. We retain the append-only
property of blockchains but abstract away the inclusion of
state updates in blocks. We assume overlay semantics that
associate blockchain data with id’s. In addition to read and
write interfaces, Fblockchain provides a convenient interface by
which clients can ascertain whether an item is included in the
blockchain. In practice, this interface avoids the overhead of
downloading the entire blockchain.
c) Parameterizing Fblockchain: In Ekiden, the contents of
storage are parsed as an ordered array of state transitions,
defined as transi = (H(sti−1), sti, σi), a tuple of a hash of
the previous state, a new state, and a proof from TEE attesting
to the correctness of a state transition. (Note that as a perfor-
mance optimization, large user input—e.g. training data in an
ML contract— may not be stored on chain.) Storage can be
interpreted as a special initial state followed by a sequence of
state transitions: Storage = ((Contract, st0, σ0),{transi}i≥1).
For a state transition to be valid, it must extends the
latest state and the attestation must verify. Formally, this is
achieved by parameterizing Fblockchain with a successor func-
tion succ(·, ·) such that succ(Storage, (h, stnew, σTEE)) = true
if and only if h = H(stold) where stold is the latest state in
Storage and ΣTEE.Vf(pkTEE, σTEE, (h, stnew)). This guarantees
that at any time there is a single sequence of state transitions
consistent with the view of each party, i.e. the chain of state
transitions is fork-free.
B. Formal Specification of the Protocol
The Ekiden protocol is formally specified in ProtEkiden
(Fig. 2). ProtEkiden relies on Gatt and Fblockchain, ideal function-
ality for attested execution and the blockchain. ProtEkiden also
use a digital signature scheme Σ(KGen,Sig,Vf), a symmetric
encryption scheme SE(KGen,Enc,Dec) and an asymmetric
encryption scheme AE(KGen,Enc,Dec).
a) Sharing state keys: Each contract is associated with
a set of keys. As discussed in Section V-B, contract TEEs
delegate key management to key manager TEEs. In ProtEkiden,
communication with key managers is abstracted away with the
keyManager function.
b) Contract creation: To create a contract in Ekiden, a
client Pi calls the create subroutine of a compute node
Comp with input Contract, a piece of contract code. Comp
loads the ̂Contract into a TEE and starts the initialization by
invoking the “create” call. As specified in Fig. 9, the contract
TEE creates a fresh contract cid, obtains fresh (pkincid, sk
in
cid)
pair and kstatecid from the key manager and generates an en-
crypted initial state st0 and an attestation σTEE. The attestation
proves the st0 is correctly initialized and that pkincid is the
corresponding public key for contract cid. The compute node
Comp sends (Contract, cid, st0, pkincid, σTEE) to Fblockchain and
waits for an receipt. Comp returns the contract cid to Pi, who
will verify that contract cid is properly stored on Fblockchain.
c) Request execution: To execute a request to contract
cid, a client Pi first obtains the input encryption key pkincid from
Fblockchain. Then Pi calls the request subroutine of Comp
with input (cid, inpct), where inpct is Pi’s input encrypted with
pkincid and authenticated with spki. Comp fetches the encrypted
previous state stct from Fblockchain and launches an contract
TEE with code ̂Contract and input (cid, inpct, stct).
As specified in Fig. 9, if σPi verifies, the contract TEE
decrypts stct and inpct with keys obtained from the key
manager and executes the contract program Contract to get
(stnew, outp). To ensure the new state and the output are
delivered atomically, Comp and Pi conduct an atomic delivery
protocol as specified in Section V-C:
• First the contract TEE computes outpct = Enc(k
out
cid, outp)
and st′ct = Enc(k
state
cid , stnew), and send both and proper
attestation to Pi in a secure channel established by epki.
• Pi acknowledges the reception by calling the
claim-output subroutine of Comp, which triggers the
contract TEE to send m1 = (st′ct, outpct, σ) to Fblockchain.
σ protects the integrity of m1 and cryptographically
binds the new state and output to a previous state and a
input, thus a malicious Comp cannot tamper with it.
• Once m1 is accepted by Fblockchain, the contract TEE
sends the decryption of outpct to Pi in a secure channel.
C. Security of ProtEkiden
Theorem 1 characterizes the security of ProtEkiden. A proof
sketch is given in Appendix B.
Theorem 1 (Security of ProtEkiden). Assume that Gatt’s attes-
tation scheme ΣTEE and the digital signature Σ are existen-
tially unforgeable under chosen message attacks (EU-CMA),
that H is second pre-image resistant, and that AE and SE are
IND-CPA secure. Then ProtEkiden securely realizes FEkiden in
the (Gatt,Fblockchain)-hybrid model, for static adversaries.
D. Mitigating app-level leakage
While Ekiden protects within-TEE data, it is not designed to
protect data at contract interfaces, i.e., data leakage resulting
from the contract design. (E.g., a secret prediction model may
be “extracted” via client queries [74].) Common approaches
to minimizing such leakage, e.g., restricting requests based
on requester identity and/or a differential-privacy budget [25],
[39], require persistent counters. The monotonic counters in
SGX are untrustworthy, however [50].
Ekiden instead supports stateful approaches to mitigate
application-level privacy leakage by enabling persistent appli-
cation state—e.g., counters, total consumed differential privacy
budget, etc.—to be maintained securely on chain. Moreover,
the aforementioned atomic delivery guarantee ensures that the
output is only revealed if this state is correctly updated.
E. Performance Optimizations
Given an additional mechanism for revocation, a simple
modification eliminates reliance on the IAS apart from ini-
tialization. When initialized, an enclave creates a signing key
(pk, sk), and outputs pk with an attestation. Subsequently,
attestations are replaced with signatures under sk. Since pk is
bound to the TEE code (by the initial attestation), signatures
under sk prove the integrity of output, just as attestations do.
As with other keys, (pk, sk) are managed by the key manager
(c.f. Section V-B).
In Appendix B we discuss an extended version of the
protocol with several other performance optimizations.
VII. IMPLEMENTATION
We implemented an Ekiden prototype in about 7.5k lines
of Rust. We also implemented a compiler that automatically
builds contracts into executables that can be loaded into a
compute node, using the Rust SGX SDK [23].
Ekiden is compatible with many existing blockchains. We
have built one end-to-end instantiation, Ekiden-BT, with a
blockchain extending from Tendermint [44], which required
no changes to Tendermint.
A. Programming Model
We support a general-purpose programming model for
specifying contracts. A contract registers a mutable struct
as its state, which Ekiden transparently serializes, encrypts,
and synchronizes with the blockchain after method calls.
Contract methods must be deterministic and terminate in
bounded time. Within this model, we implemented two smart-
contract programming environments. In the Rust backend,
developers can write contracts using a subset of the Rust
programming language, and thus benefit from a range of
open source libraries. We also ported the Ethereum Virtual
Machine (EVM), thereby supporting any contract written for
ProtEkiden(λ,AE,SE,Σ,{Pi}i∈[N])
1 : Clients Pi:
2 : Initialize: (sski, spki)←$Σ.KGen(1λ)
3 : (eski, epki)←$AE.KGen(1λ)
4 : On receive (“create”,Contract) from environment Z:
5 : cid := create(Contract); assert cid initialized on Fblockchain
6 : output (“receipt”, cid)
7 : On receive (“request”, cid, inp, eid) from environment Z:
8 : σPi := Sig(sski, (cid, inp))
9 : get pkincid from Fblockchain;
10 : let inpct := AE.Enc(pkincid, (inp, σPi ))
11 : (st′ct, outpct, σ) := request(cid, inpct)
12 : parse σ as (σTEE, hinp, hold, houtp, spki)
13 : assert H(inpct) = hinp; assert outpct is correct by verifying σ
14 : o := claim-output(cid, st′ct, outpct, σ, epki)
15 : // retry if the previous state has been used by a parallel query
16 : if o = ⊥ then jump to the beginning of the “request” call
17 : parse o as (outp′ct, σTEE)
18 : assert ΣTEE.Vf(pkTEE, σTEE, outp
′
ct) // pkTEE := Gatt.getpk()
19 : output AE.Dec(eski, outp′ct)
20 : On receive (“read”, cid) from environment Z:
21 : send (“read”, cid) to Fblockchain and relay output
22 : Compute Nodes Subroutines (called by clients Pi):
23 : On input create(Contract):
24 : send (“install”, ̂Contract) to Gatt, wait for eid
25 : send (eid, “resume”, (“create”)) to Gatt
26 : wait for ((Contract, cid, st0, pkincid), σTEE)
27 : send (“write”, (Contract, cid, st0, pkincid, σTEE)) to Fblockchain
28 : wait to receive (“receipt”, cid)
29 : On input request(cid, inpct):
30 : send (“read”, cid) to Fblockchain and wait for stct
31 : // non-existing eid is assumed to be created transparently
32 : send (eid, “resume”, (“request”, cid, inpct, stct)) to Gatt
33 : receive ((“atom-deliver”, hinp, hold, st′ct, houtp, spki), σTEE, outpct)
34 : // σTEE = ΣTEE.Sig(skTEE, (hinp, hold, st′ct, houtp, spki))
35 : let σ := (σTEE, hinp, hold, houtp, spki)
36 : return (st′ct, outpct, σ)
37 : On input claim-output(cid, st′ct, outpct, σ, epki):
38 : send (“write”, cid, (st′ct, σ)) to Fblockchain
39 : if receive (“reject”, cid) from Fblockchain then: return ⊥
40 : send (eid, “resume”, (“claim output”, st′ct, outpct, σ, epki)) to Gatt
41 : receive (“output”, outp′ct, σTEE) from Gatt or abort
42 : return (outp′ct, σTEE)
Fig. 2. Ekiden Protocol. The contract TEE program ̂Contract is defined in Figure 9, in Appendix A.
the Ethereum platform. The system currently does not support
calling contract functions from another contract. We leave this
for future work.
B. Applications
We now describe several different applications we devel-
oped to show the versatility of Ekiden’s programming model.
Figure 3 highlights the secret state and application complexity
of each contract.
a) Machine Learning Contracts: To demonstrate shared
learning on secret data, we implemented two example con-
tracts: (i) credit scoring based on financial records [8] and (ii)
predicting the likelihood of heart disease based on medical
records [67]. In both of these, we used a version of the rusty-
machine [7] machine learning library, which we ported to run
inside our contracts. The training data given to these example
contracts is treated as sensitive data (we use data from the
UCI machine learning repository [46] in our experiments) and
never exposed as plaintext outside the contract.
Our example contracts train the models with added noise
for differential privacy. This prevents information about the
training data from leaking [70] during inference. Ekiden’s
private computation guarantee allows the noise to be added
centrally, which results in better accuracy and utility at the
same level of privacy, compared to having clients add noise
before submitting their data [26]. Additionally, after training,
multiple compute nodes can run serve inference requests at
high capacity without affecting correctness or privacy.
b) Smart Building Thermal Modeling: We ported an
implementation of non-linear least squares, which is used to
predict temperatures based on time series thermal data from
smart buildings [22]. We have deployed this smart contract to
train a shared model across real-time data from select buildings
in Berkeley, CA. These buildings sample their temperature
sensors every 20 seconds, generating data used to update the
predictive model. Ekiden allows the contract to run its model
while keeping the sensor data and model secret, demonstrating
that our system is sufficiently responsive for highly interactive
workloads in an online setting.
c) Tokens: The most popular kind of Ethereum contract
is the ERC20 token standard. Using the Ethereum port (Sec-
tion VII-A), we can run existing ERC20 token contracts. We
also implemented a token contract written directly in Rust,
which yields moderate performance improvement (see Sec-
tion VIII). In either case, Ekiden automatically provides pri-
vacy and anonymity, which the contract would not receive on
the Ethereum mainnet. The secret state in the token the account
balance for each user.
d) Poker: We also implemented a poker contract, where
users take turns submitting their actions to the contract, and the
smart contract contains all of the game logic for shuffling and
(selectively) revealing cards. Poker is a common benchmark
application for blockchain systems and secure multi-party
computation called mental poker [11], [43], [42], [6]. Ekiden
is significantly more robust than these prior implementations
in how it handles player aborts. In most mental poker, if
Application Language LoC Secret Input/Output Secret State
Machine Learning Rust 806 Training data, predictions Model
Thermal Modeling Rust 621 Sensor data, temperature Building model
Token Rust 514 Transfer (from, to, amount) Account balances
Poker Rust 883 Players’ cards Shuffled deck
Ethereum VM Rust 1411 Input and output Contract state
CryptoKitties EVM Bytecode 54∗ Random mutations Breeding algorithm
Origin Demo Solidity, JS 19∗ Purchase orders Purchase history
Fig. 3. Ekiden smart contracts. For each, we specify the implementation language, development effort (LoC), as well as secret inputs, outputs, and state.
Secret inputs and outputs are only accessible to the contract and the invoking user. Secret state is only accessible to the contract. For the EVM, we only
include the cost of porting Parity-Ethereum’s runtime. For CryptoKitties and Origin Demo, we only include LoC specific to porting, as marked by ∗.
a party aborts, its secret hand cannot be reconstructed by
others, so the game aborts. Handling faults in secure multi-
party computation requires application-specific changes to the
cryptographic protocol [18]. Because Ekiden persists state to
the blockchain after each action, and can be accessed from any
enclave, secret cards can still be revealed if a player aborts.
e) CryptoKitties: CryptoKitties [1] is an Ethereum game
that allows users to breed virtual cats, which are stored on
chain as ERC721 tokens [2]. Each cat has a unique set of
genes that determine its appearance and therefore its value.
The traits of offspring are determined by a smart contract that
mixes the genes of its parents. The source code of the gene
mixing contract is not publicly available: The game developers
aimed to make the breeding process unpredictable.
We obtained the bytecode for the gene mixing contract
from the Ethereum blockchain and executed it using our
Ekiden EVM port. We verified correct behavior by reproducing
real transactions from the Ethereum network. This example
demonstrates that Ekiden can execute an Ethereum contract
even when source code is not available. Further, Ekiden can
provide unique benefits for smart contracts requiring secrecy
or unpredictability such as CryptoKitties. These properties are
difficult to achieve with Ethereum. E.g., the CryptoKitties gene
mixing algorithm has been reverse-engineered [80], which
allows strategic players to optimize their chance of breeding
cats with rare traits, thus undermining the game’s ecosystem.
By contrast, an Ekiden contract has access to a source of
randomness in hardware and allows secret elements of a
game’s algorithm to be stored in encrypted state.
f) Origin: Origin [61] is a platform for building online
marketplaces on top of Ethereum. We ported a demo applica-
tion which allows users to list and purchase items with Ether.
This application further demonstrates that development frame-
works built for Ethereum can be easily used by Ekiden: the
smart contracts used in the demo work without modification;
we were able to integrate the rest of the demo, namely, a user-
facing web server, with minor modifications. Built on Ekiden,
users’ transaction history in the blockchain are kept private,
and transactions are confirmed faster than on Ethereum.
VIII. EVALUATION
In this section, we present evaluation results for end-
to-end latency and peak throughput. We evaluated the five
applications of Section VII-B: a Rust token contract Token,
implementing an ERC20-like token in the Rust language,
two Ethereum contracts, ERC20 and CryptoKitties, running
in the ported EVM, and two machine learning applications,
Credit and Thermal. Compared to an ERC20 contract on
Ethereum mainnet, Ekiden-BT can support a token contract
with 600x greater throughput, 400x less latency, at 1000x
less monetary cost. While we expect some mild performance
degradation when deployed with a larger scale blockchain,
our performance optimizations significantly reduce the effect
of the blockchain’s speed, as shown below. Furthermore, we
demonstrate that Ekiden can efficiently support computation-
intensive workloads such as machine learning applications
which would be cost-prohibitive on Ethereum. We also quan-
tify the performance gains from each of the optimizations
described in Appendix B. We show that batching, caching,
and a write-ahead log improve performance and reduce the
network costs of synchronizing state with the blockchain.
A. Experimental Setup
To evaluate the performance of Ekiden-BT, we ran exper-
iments with four consensus nodes hosted on Amazon EC2
across different availability zones and one compute node (with
a Core i7-6500U CPU with 8GB of memory) hosted locally,
as EC2 does not offer SGX-enabled instances at the time of
writing. Transactions are only run once on the compute node
(K = 1). Each consensus node was run on an t2.medium
instance, with 2 CPU cores and 4 GB of memory. As shown
in Section VIII-C, we do not expect throughput performance
to be significantly impacted by a larger slower blockchain,
because many transactions can be compressed into a single
write onto the blockchain. By separating execution from con-
sensus, these layers can work in parallel. However achieving
consensus among a larger group of consensus nodes will result
in higher end-to-end latencies.
B. End-to-End Latency
Figure 4 shows end-to-end latency for calling the token,
CryptoKitties, and machine learning contracts, plotted on a
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Fig. 4. End-to-end latency of client requests for various contracts, plotted on
a log scale. Running Rust token and ERC20 token contracts on Ekiden-BT
yields transactions 2-5 orders of magnitude faster than Ethereum. Read-write
transactions on the Ekiden-BT blockchain take about a second, dominated
by the underlying blockchain. Caching avoids writes to the blockchain for
read-only transactions (e.g. get). We only compare Ethereum for the ERC20
contract, as there are no comparable machine learning contracts on Ethereum.
log scale. For the “Ekiden-BT” plot, we start our timer when
the client triggers a request and end when the smart-contract
response, committed on chain, is decrypted. For read-only
transactions like “Token:get” or “Credit:infer”, compute nodes
use a locally cached copy of state. Writes to the Ekiden-BT
blockchain take up to a second to confirm. Latencies in Ekiden
are dominated by the time to commit on chain. This relative
cost is lower for compute-intensive workloads like machine
learning training. For comparison, we include a bar (“compute-
only”) that measures computation time only.
For the three transactions that could be run on the Ethereum
network, we plot the publicly reported block rates of the
Ethereum mainnet in March 2018 [28], which represents
the optimistic case that transactions are incorporated in the
next block. Compared to the proof-of-work protocol used
in Ethereum, Ekiden-BT has 2-3 orders of magnitude faster
confirmations, in part due to the use of a faster blockchain.
For the ERC20 token, which runs on the EVM in Ekiden-BT,
we see similar performance to the Rust token contract, because
both use the same consensus protocol.
C. Throughput
To measure Ekiden-BT’s peak performance, we conducted
an experiment with 1000 clients, each sending 100 serialized
requests to a compute node. For each data point, we disregard
the first and last 10% of requests, averaging the stable perfor-
mance under stress. Figure 5 shows the results for the token,
CryptoKitties, and machine learning contracts. For the base-
line, we implement the simplest Ekiden-BT protocol, where
each request triggers a full state checkpoint on our blockchain.
In the “Ekiden-BT” bar, we include our optimizations, as
described in Appendix B. Batching compresses multiple state
checkpoints into a single commit on the blockchain. We then
cache the latest state on compute nodes and use a write-
ahead log for state updates. Our optimizations have the greatest
benefit for read-write operations, like transfer. They have
less benefit for contracts with smaller states, such as the ma-
chine learning contract with small models. Conversely, writes
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Fig. 5. Throughput comparison across contracts and systems. Our baseline
reads and writes to a blockchain for every request. Throughput is limited
by blockchain performance. Our optimizations improve performance by 2–
4 orders of magnitude over the baseline, with more advantage for read-write
operations on contracts with large state (e.g. Token). In-EVM operations incur
about 10x higher cost compared to our Rust token. For ERC20, we achieve
1–2 orders of magnitude higher performance than Ethereum.
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Fig. 6. Peak throughput performance of token transfers under different
consensus layer commit times. Because contract execution occurs in parallel
to state agreement, we show that good throughput performance for a wide
range of commit times on the consensus layer. We expect Ekiden to perform
well on a variety of blockchains.
to the blockchain significantly impact performance for read-
write transactions, compared to read-only transactions with
cached state. For comparison on the transactions that could be
run on the Ethereum network, we plot the publicly reported
transaction throughput of the Ethereum mainnet in March
2018 [28]. Because CryptoKitties incurs higher computational
cost, we can fit fewer transactions in a block due to the gas
limit, compared to ERC20 transactions.
D. Impact of Consensus on Throughput
To understand the impact of using different consensus
protocols with Ekiden, we measured peak throughput per-
formance of token transfers as a function of the time to
commit state to the blockchain. In order to simulate slower
consensus protocols, we inject a variable delay for writes to
the consensus nodes. Figure 6 shows that token transfers have
good performance for a wide range of commit latencies seen
in popular blockchains.
Because state is cached at compute nodes, compute nodes
can opportunistically execute new transactions without waiting
for a response from consensus nodes. Periodically, compute
nodes asynchronously commit the state to the blockchain, as
defined by the batch size. By separating contract execution
from agreement on state, the layers can operate in parallel.
In contrast, Ethereum transactions are broadcast to all min-
ers. Miners execute transactions sequentially, and all contracts
are serialized onto a single blockchain. At the time of writing,
there are 36974 ERC20 token contracts, all using the Ethereum
blockchain [28]. In contrast, Ekiden parallelizes contracts
across compute nodes, eliminating computational bottlenecks
for better performance. However, implementation of full cross-
contract calls remains future work.
E. Transaction Costs
In March 2018 on Ethereum, it cost 52K gas ($0.17 USD)
to perform a transfer on an ERC20 token contract and 130K
gas ($0.39 USD) to compute the breeding algorithm on
CryptoKitties [3]. By contrast, IBM rents machines with Intel
SGX processors useable by Ekiden for $260.00 per month.
These can do a token transfer in 2ms and CryptoKitties
breeding in 100ms, at a cost of roughly 10−7 and 10−5 dollars
respectively, and a cost of 10−5 dollars for each call to train in
our machine learning contract. For these contracts, the cost to
commit state to the Ethereum blockchain ranges from $0.0688
for CryptoKitties to $1.92 to store a 1KB machine learning
model. Because Ekiden can compress results from multiple
requests into a single write to the blockchain, our system has a
total cost vastly less than that of on-chain execution. There are
no current public deployments of Tendermint for comparison.
IX. RELATED WORK
Confidential smart contracts: Hawk [41] is a smart contract
system that provides confidentiality by executing contracts
off-chain and posting only zero-knowledge proofs on-chain.
As the zero-knowledge proofs in Hawk (zk-SNARKs) incur
very high computational overhead, Ekiden is significantly
faster. Additionally, Hawk was designed for a single compute
node (called the “manager”), and thus cannot (as designed)
offer high availability. While Ekiden does require trust in the
security of Intel SGX, Hawk’s “manager” must be trusted for
privacy. Hawk supports only a limited range of contract types,
not the general functionality of Ekiden.
The idea of combining ledgers with trusted hardware for
smart contract execution is briefly mentioned in Hawk and also
treated in [21], [40]. [21] combines blockchain with TEE to
achieve one-time programs that resemble smart contracts but
only aim for a restricted functionality (one-shot MPC with
N parties providing input). [40] includes a basic prototype,
but omits critical system design issues; e.g., its permission-
less “proof-of-publication” overlooks the technical difficulties
arising from lack of trusted wall-clock time in enclaves.
Ekiden is also closely related to and influenced by Hyper-
ledger Private Data Objects (PDO) [14] from Intel. PDOs use
smart contracts, executed in SGX enclaves, to mediate access
to data objects shared amongst mutually distrusting parties.
To the best of our knowledge, PDOs target permissioned and
managed settings (requiring, e.g., special-purpose validation
rules), while Ekiden supports permisionless and open settings
as well. This leads to key technical differences. For example,
PDO uses a set of Provisioning Services to store encryption
keys without worrying about availability risk, which cannot be
easily realized in the Ekiden setting where churn is possible. In
contrast, Ekiden uses a secret-sharing-based key management
protocol that tolerates churn and allows flexible committee
reconfiguration.
The Microsoft Coco Framework [54] is concurrent and
independent work to port existing smart contract systems,
such as Ethereum, into an SGX enclave. To the best of
our knowledge, only a whitepaper containing a high-level
overview has been produced. No details of a protocol or
implementation have yet been released.
Blockchain transaction privacy: Ekiden’s goals relate to
mechanisms for enhancing transaction privacy on public
blockchains. Maxwell proposed a confidential transaction
scheme [51] for Bitcoin that conceals transaction amounts,
but not identities. Zerocash [9] as well as Cryptonote [71],
[76], Solidus [19], and Zerocoin [55] provides stronger confi-
dentiality guarantees by concealing identities. These schemes,
however, do not support smart contracts.
Privacy-preserving systems based on trusted hardware:
Trusted hardware, particularly Intel SGX, has seen a wide
spectrum of applications in distributed systems. M2R [24],
VC3 [69], Opaque [79] and Ohrimenko et al. [59] leverage
SGX to offer privacy-preserving data analytics and machine
learning with various security guarantees, Ryoan [35] is a
distributed sandbox platform using SGX to confine privacy
leakage from untrusted applications that process sensitive data.
These systems do not address state integrity and confidentiality
over a long-lived system. In comparison, Ekiden provides
a stronger integrity and availability guarantees by persisting
contract states on a blockchain.
Blockchains for verifiable computations and secure multi-
party computations: Several related works offer blockchain-
based guarantees of computation integrity, but cannot guar-
antee privacy [49], [73], [72]. Other works have used a
blockchain for fairness in MPC by requiring parties to forfeit
security deposits if they abort [11], [43], [42], [6], [81],
[21]. Compared to these, Ekiden can guarantee that all data
can be recovered if any compute node remains online. TEE-
based computation is also far more performant than MPC.
A theoretical scheme [31] combines witness encryption with
proof-of-stake blockchains to achieve one-time programs that
resemble smart contracts but avoid use of trusted hardware.
This scheme is regrettably even more impractical than MPC.
X. CONCLUSION
Ekiden demonstrates that blockchains and trusted enclaves
have complementary security properties that can be com-
bined effectively to provide a powerful, generic platform
for confidentiality-preserving smart contracts. The result is
a compelling programming model that overcomes significant
challenges in blockchain smart contracts. We show that Ekiden
can be used to implement a variety of secure decentralized
applications that compute on sensitive data.
In future work we plan to extend Ekiden to operate under
a stronger threat model, leveraging techniques such as secure
multi-party computation [47], [21], [6], to protect the system’s
more critical features, such as key management and coordina-
tion across compute nodes. Coordination can also facilitate
parallelism in contract execution, merging concurrent output
from multiple enclaves to obtain still higher performance from
Ekiden.
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APPENDIX
A. Supplementary Formalism
1) Ideal Blockchain: We specify the ideal functionality for
a blockchain in Fig. 7.
2) Ideal functionality FEkiden: We specify the security goals
of Ekiden in the ideal functionality FEkiden defined in Figure 8.
FEkiden allows parties to create contracts and interact with
them. Each party Pi is identified by a unique id simply denoted
Pi. Parties send messages over authenticated channels. To
capture the allowed information leakage from the encryption,
we follow the convention of [17] and parameterize FEkiden
with a leakage function `(·). We use the standard delayed
output terminology [17] to model the power of the network
adversary. Specifically, when FEkiden sends a delayed output
outp to P , this means that outp is first sent to the adversary
FEkiden(λ, `,{Pi}i∈[N])
1 : Parameter: leakage function ` : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗
2 : On receive (“init”): Storage := ∅
3 : // Create a new contract
4 : On receive (“create”,Contract) from Pi for some i ∈ [N ]:
5 : cid←$ {0, 1}λ
6 : notify A of (“create”,Pi, cid,Contract); block until A replies
7 : Storage[cid] := (Contract,~0)
8 : send a public delayed output (“receipt”, cid) to Pi
9 : // Send queries to a contract
10 : On receive (“request”, cid, inp, eid) from Pi for some i ∈ [N ]:
11 : notify A of (“request”, cid,Pi, `(inp))
12 : (Contract, st, ) := Storage[cid]; abort if not found
13 : (outp, st′) := Contract(Pi, inp, st)
14 : let `st = `(st)
15 : notify A of (cid, `st′ , `(outp), eid)
16 : wait for “ok” from A and halt if other messages received
17 : update Storage[cid] := (Contract, st′, `st′ )
18 : send a secret delayed output outp to Pi
19 : // Allow public access to encrypted state
20 : On receive (“read”, cid) from Pi for some i ∈ [N ]:
21 : ( , , `st) := Storage[cid]; abort if not found
22 : send `st to Pi
23 : if Pi is corrupted: send `st to A
Fig. 8. The ideal functionality of Ekiden.
A and forwarded to P after acknowledgement by A. If the
message is secret, only the allowed amount of leakage (i.e.,
that specified by the leakage function) is revealed to S.
A Contract is a user-provided program. Each smart contract
is associated with a piece of persistent storage where the
contract code and st can be stored. The storage is public;
therefore FEkiden allows any party, including A, to read the
storage content. The information leakage through such reading
is also defined by the leakage function `.
Users can send queries to FEkiden to execute the contract
code with user-provided input. The execution of a contract
will result in a secret output (denoted outp) returned to the
invoker and a secret transition to a new contract state (denoted
st′), equivalent intuitively to black-box contract execution
(modulo leakage). Although any party may send messages to
the contract, the contract code can enforce access control based
on the calling pseudonym passed to the contract.
a) Corruption model: FEkiden adopts the standard cor-
ruption model of [17]. A can corrupt any number of clients,
and up to all but one contract executors. When A corrupts a
TEE (or similarly a party), A sends the message (“corrupt”,
eid) to FEkiden. If a query includes an invalid TEE id, FEkiden
aborts if instructed by A. Otherwise the ideal functionality
ignores eids, which are included in FEkiden only as a technical
requirement to ensure interface compatibility with ProtEkiden,
given below.
3) Contract TEE wrapper: The contract TEE wrapper
̂Contract is specified in Fig. 9.
Contract TEE wrapper ̂Contract
1 : On input (“create”) :
2 : cid := H(Contract)
3 : (pkincid, sk
in
cid) := keyManager(“input key”)
4 : kstatecid := keyManager(“state key”)
5 : st0 = SE.Enc(kstatecid ,~0)
6 : return (Contract, cid, state0, pkincid)
7 : On input (“request”, cid, inpct, stct):
8 : // retrieve skincid, k
state
cid from a key manager as above
9 : (inp, σPi ) := AE.Dec(skincid, inpct)
10 : assert Vf(σPi , spki, (cid, inp)) // spki is publicly known
11 : stold := SE.Dec(kstatecid , stct)
12 : stnew, outp := Contract(stold, inp, spki)
13 : st′ct := SE.Enc(kstatecid , stnew)
14 : // initiate atomic delivery
15 : koutcid := keyManager(“output key”)
16 : outpct := SE.Enc(koutcid, outp)
17 : let hinp := H(inpct), hold := H(stct), houtp = H(outpct)
18 : return ((“atom-deliver”, hinp, hold, st′ct, houtp, spki), outpct)
19 : On input (“claim output”, st′ct, outpct, σ, epki):
20 : parse σ as (σTEE, hinp, hold, houtp, spki)
21 : assert H(outpct) = houtp
22 : send (“∈”, cid, (st′ct, σ)) to Fblockchain
23 : receive true from Fblockchain or abort
24 : koutcid := keyManager(“output key”)
25 : outp := SE.Dec(koutcid, outpct)
26 : return (“output”,AE.Enc(epk, outp))
Fig. 9. Contract TEE wrapper.
B. Proof of Publication
The protocol for proof of publication is specified in Fig. 10.
Here we give our proof of Theorem 1, given in Section VI.
We prove that ProtEkiden[λ,AE ,SE ,Σ,{Pi}i∈[N ]] UC-
realizes the ideal functionality FEkiden[λ, `,{Pi}] with respect
to a leakage function `(x) that only reveals the length of x,
i.e. `(x) = 0|x|. In the protocol, `(·) is realized with IND-CPA
encryption schemes.
Proof. Let Z be an environment and A be a “dummy adver-
sary” [17] who simply relays messages between Z and parties.
To show that ProtEkiden UC-realizes FEkiden, we specify below
a simulator Sim such that no environment can distinguish an
interaction between ProtEkiden and A from an interaction with
FEkiden and Sim, i.e. Sim satisfies
∀Z,EXECProtEkiden,A,Z ≈ EXECFEkiden,Sim,Z .
a) Construction of Sim: Sim generally proceeds as fol-
lows: if a message is sent by an honest party to FEkiden,
Sim emulates appropriate real world “network traffic” for Z
with information obtained from FEkiden. If a message is sent
to FEkiden by a corrupted party, Sim extracts the input and
interacts with the corrupted party with the help of FEkiden. We
provide further details on the processing of specific messages.
(1) Contract creation:
Proof of Publication of m between verifier E and prover P
1 : Parameters:
2 : nc: publication of m needs at least nc confirmation
3 : CB : a recent checkpoint block
4 : δ(CB): difficulty of CB
5 : τ : expected block interval of main chain
6 : : slackness factor
7 : Verifier E (a contract TEE):
8 : t1 ← TEE.timer()
9 : r ←$ {0, 1}λ
10 : send (m, r) to P
11 : receive pi(m,r) = (CB,B1, · · · , Bn) from P
12 : t2 ← TEE.timer()
13 : if pi(m,r) is not a valid chain, output false
14 : let Bi ∈ pi(m,r) be the block that contains (m, r), output false if @Bi
15 : if Bi has less than nc confirmation, i.e. n− i < nc, output false
16 : if any B ∈ pi(m,r) has a lower difficulty than δ(CB), output false
17 : if t2 − t1 < (n− i)× τ × : output true and update checkpiont CB = Bn
18 : else : output false
19 : Prover P:
20 : On receive (m, r) from E :
21 : send (m, r) to the blockchain, denote the including block Bi
22 : send a subchain from CB to Bi+nc (inclusive) to E
Fig. 10. Proof of Publication
• If Pi is honest, Sim obtains (Pi, cid,Contract) from
FEkiden and emulates an execution of the “create” call
of ProtEkiden.
• If Pi is corrupted, Sim extracts Contract from Z . On
behalf of Pi, Sim sends (“create”,Contract) to FEkiden
and instructs FEkiden to deliver the output.
• In both cases, Sim simulates the interaction between
Fblockchain and Gatt, on behalf of the adversary or honest
parties.
(2) Query execution:
Case 1: When an honest party Pi is given input
(“request”, cid, inp, eid) by Z , Sim works as follows:
• Upon receiving (cid,Pi, `(inp)) from FEkiden, Sim queries
the “read” interface of FEkiden to obtain the dummy state
(i.e. a random string with the same length as the real state)
of cid, denoted s. Sim computes cinp = Enc(pkincid,~0) with
length `(inp), and emulates a “resume” message to Gatt
with input (“request”, cid, cinp, s) on behalf of Pi.
• Upon receiving `st′ and `(outp) from FEkiden, Sim
computes c = Enc(koutcid, 0
|outp|) and emulates a message
((“atom-deliver”,H(cinp),H(s), `st′ ,H(c), spki), σTEE, c)
from Gatt to Pi.
• Sim proceeds by emulating the interaction
between Fblockchain and Gatt, and a message
(“output”,Enc(epki, 0
|outp|), σTEE) from Gatt to Pi.
• Finally, Sim instructs FEkiden by sending a “ok” message.
Case 2: When a corrupted party Pi is given input
(“request”, cid, inp, eid) by Z , Sim learns the input when Sim
works as follows:
• If Pi sends (“read”, cid) to Fblockchain, Sim obtains the
latest state (denoted s) from FEkiden, and sends s to Pi
on behalf of Fblockchain.
• If Pi sends a “resume” message to Gatt with input
(“request”, cid, inpct, s), Sim emulates Gatt as follows: Sim
queries FEkiden to check if s is not the latest state, Sim
aborts. Sim computes inp′ = Dec(skincid, inpct). Then Sim
sends (“request”, cid, inp′, eid) to FEkiden on Pi’s behalf.
• Upon receiving `st′ct and `(outp) from FEkiden, Sim
computes c = Enc(koutcid, 0
|outp|) and sends
((“atom-deliver”,H(inpct),H(s), `st′ct ,H(c)), σTEE, c)
from Gatt to Pi. Sim records c.
• If Pi sends a “resume” message to Gatt with input
(“claim output”, cid, (st′ct, outpct, σ, epki)), Sim emulates
Gatt as follows: Sim first checks that Gatt has previously
sent outpct to Pi and that (st′ct, σ) has been stored by
Fblockchain. Sim aborts if any of the above checks fails.
Sim obtains outp from FEkiden and sends
(“output”,Enc(epki, outp), σ) to Pi.
(3) Public read: On any call (“read”, cid) from Pi, Sim
emulates a “read” message to Fblockchain. If Pi is corrupted,
Sim sends to FEkiden a “read” message on Pi’s behalf and
forward the response to A.
(4) Corrupted enclaves:
Sim obtains eids of corrupted enclaves when Z corrupts
them. In real world, Z could terminate a corrupted enclave
at any point, or could strategically drop some messages while
letting others go through. To faithfully emulate Z’s “damage”,
Sim sends every messages leaving or entering a corrupted
enclave to Z and only delivers the message if Z permits.
Sim instructs FEkiden to abort if the emulated execution is
terminated by Z prematurely. Specifically, upon receiving
(cid, `(st′), `(outp), eid) from FEkiden, Sim replies with “ok”
only if the corresponding “output” message from Gatt is
allowed by Z .
b) Validity of Sim: We show that no environment can
distinguish an interaction withA and ProtEkiden from one with
Sim and FEkiden by hybrid arguments. Consider a sequence
of hybrids, starting with the real protocol execution. Hybrid
H1 lets Sim to emulate Gatt and Fblockchain. H2 filters out the
forgery attacks against ΣTEE. H3 filters out the second pre-
image attacks against the hash function. H4 has Sim emulate
the creation phase. H5 replaces the encryption of input and
output with encryption of 0, and replaces encryption of states
with random strings with the same length. The indispensability
between adjacent hybrids are shown below.
Hybrid H1 proceeds as in the real world protocol, except that
Sim emulates Gatt and Fblockchain. Specially Sim generates a key
pair (pkTEE, skTEE) for ΣTEE and publishes pkTEE. Whenever
A wants to communicate with Gatt, Sim records A’s messages
and faithfully emulates Gatt’s behavior. Similarly, Sim emulates
Fblockchain by storing items internally.
As A’s view in H1 is perfectly simulated as in the real
world, Z cannot distinguish between H1 and the real execu-
tion.
Hybrid H2 proceeds as in H1, except for the following
modifications. If A invoked Gatt with a correct message
(“install”, ̂Contract), then for all sequential “resume” calls,
Sim records a tuple (outp, σTEE) where outp is the output of
̂Contract and σTEE is an attestation under skTEE. Let Ω denote
the set of all such tuples. Whenever A sends an attested output
(outp, σTEE) 6∈ Ω to Fblockchain or an honest party Pi, Sim
aborts.
The indistinguishability between H1 and H2 can be shown
by the following reduction to the the EU-CMA property of
Σ: In H1, if A sends forged attestations to Fblockchain or Pi,
signature verification by Fblockchain or an honest party Pi will
fail with all but negligible probability. If Z can distinguish H2
from H1, Z and A can be used to win the game of signature
forgery.
Hybrid H3 is the same as H2 besides the following modifica-
tions. If A invoked Gatt with a correct “request” message, Sim
records execution result outpct before outputting it. Whenever
A sends to Gatt a “claim output” message with a input outp′ct
that is not previously generated by Gatt, Sim aborts.
The indistinguishability between H3 and H2 can be shown
by a reduction to the second pre-image resistance property of
the hash function. In H2, A obtains H =
{
H(outpict)
}
i
and
O = {outpict}i from Gatt through “request” calls. If A sends a
“claim output” message with outpct 6∈ O, Gatt aborts unless a
H(outpct) ∈ H. If Z can distinguish H3 from H2, it follows
that A can break the second pre-image resistancy.
Hybrid H4 is the same as H3 but has Sim emulate the contract
creation, i.e. honest parties will send “create” to FEkiden. Sim
emulates messages from Gatt and Fblockchain as described above.
If Pi is corrupted, Sim sends (“create”,Contract) to FEkiden
as Pi.
It is clear that the A’s view is distributed exactly as in H3,
as Sim can emulate Gatt and Fblockchain perfectly.
Hybrid H5 is the same as H4 except that honest parties
also sends “request” messages to FEkiden. If Pi is corrupted,
Sim emulates real-world messages with the help of FEkiden, as
described above.
In A’s view, the difference between H5 and H4 are the
following.
• Any message (“atom-deliver”, hinp, hold, s, houtp, c) sent
from Gatt to Pi with s = SE .Enc(kstatecid , st′) and
c = SE .Enc(koutcid, outp)) in H4 is replaced with
(“atom-deliver”, hinp, hold, `st′ct ,H(c
′), c′) where c′ =
Enc(koutcid, 0
|c|). Recall that `st′ct is a random string with
length |st′ct| chosen by FEkiden when generating state stct.
• If Pi is an honest party, any message
(“request”, cid,AE .Enc(pkincid, inp), s) sent to
Gatt is replaced with (“request”, cid, c′, s)
where c′ = Enc(pkincid, 0), and any message
(“output”,AE .Enc(koutcid, outp)) sent from Gatt to Pi
is replaced with (“output”,Enc(epki, 0)).
Indistinguishability between H5 and H4 can be directly
reduced to the IND-CPA property of AE and SE . Having no
knowledge of the secret key, A cannot distinguish encryption
of ~0 from encryption of other messages. Note that we don’t
require IND-CCA security becauseA do not have direct access
to an decryption oracle.
It remains to observe that H5 is identical to the ideal pro-
tocol. Throughout the simulation, we maintain the following
invariant: FEkiden always has the latest state, regardless who
created the contract and who has queried the contract. This
invariant ensures that H5 precisely reflects ideal execution of
FEkiden.
In this section we discuss several performance optimizations
to the simple protocol. Together, these optimizations reduce
the number of round trips and storage capacity required from
the blockchain, and reduce work for compute nodes. As we
show in Section VIII, the impact is significant, up to 200%
better for write-heavy workloads. Despite the performance
improvements, all optimizations are transparent to the security
interface: we use the same ideal functionality for both the
simple and extended protocols. We present a formal protocol
block defining the enhanced protocol ProtfullEkiden in Figure 11.
For now, we provide a high-level description of the insight
and challenges involved in each application.
c) Using a write-ahead log: In the original protocol, the
entire encrypted state stct is written to the blockchain after
each query. The entire state needs to be re-encrypted because
the modification side-effect should not leak information to the
adversary. However, this approach is inefficient when each st
is very large yet each query modifies only a small part. In
our Token application, for example, we model a token with
500,000 different user accounts, even though each transaction
only debits one account and credits one other.
Our first observation is that the use of a write-ahead log
can reduce this expense. We modify the protocol so that only
the “diff” of the state, ∆stct is written to the blockchain. To
determine the current state, the enclave must parse the entire
diff sequence, starting from the initial state, and applying each
patch. In the token application, each transaction touches a
constant number of records, hence requiring O(M+T ) storage
complexity for T transactions if there are M users, compared
to O(MT ) in the simple protocol.
The encryption of the diff ∆stct may leak information about
which query was invoked. The token application has constant-
time queries, but in general applications, it may be necessary
to bound the size of queries and pad the ciphertext. Finally,
we note that the ideal functionality FEkiden is parameterized
by a leakage function `, such that the notation is in place to
model the effect leakage resulting from unpadded queries.
d) Caching intermediate states at the enclave: In the
simple protocol, each round begins with reading the state
ciphertext from the blockchain, and ends with writing the
next state ciphertext from the blockchain. In the case that
In our extended protocol, we optimistically use the previous
state in the Cache, if available. This results in a performance
improvement when the same enclave eid is used for multiple
sequential queries. This is especially beneficial when the write-
ahead log grows large.
Bootstrapping from genesis seems to be necessary whenever
a query is sent to a new enclave (e.g., because the previously-
used enclave host has crashed). In practice, we also define a
policy for checkpoints by storing the entire state (not just the
diff) after every fixed number of intervals. We leave the formal
presentation of this generalization to future work.
e) Batching transactions off-chain: Just as the caching
optimization above removes the need to read from the
blockchain in each query, we can also coalesce the writes
for multiple sequential queries into a single message to the
blockchain. This reduces both the number of network round
trips, as well as the total communication cost. When multiple
queries in a batch write to the same location, only the last
write needs to be stored on the blockchain.
In our protocol we do not define a policy for how many
transactions must go in a batch. Instead, we formally expose
this choice to the adversary. The choice of batching strategy
has no impact on the security guarantees of our formalism.
Each query invocation simply stores the inputs in a buffer,
and the adversary can invoke the commitBatch method at
any time to commit the entire buffer.
Batching is not a panacea. In order to maintain security,
the decrypted outputs must not leave the enclave unless the
updated state ∆stct is committed in the blockchain. Hence a
user cannot receive output from a query until the entire batch is
committed, and so only input-independent queries can appear
in the same batch.
f) Coordinating the choice of compute nodes: The Eki-
den protocol leaves it up to the client to decide which compute
node and enclave to query. All of the security guarantees
of FEkiden hold regardless of this choice. As a pragmatic
solution, we propose to have clients defer to centralized coor-
dinators that perform load balancing and random assignment
of compute nodes to tasks, based on reputations and prior
experience. If a task is not completed after some timeout,
the coordinator can signal the client to repeat the query
at another enclave. Randomization can ensure that a host
cannot adaptively choose a particular target task to degrade
service. In this way Ekiden would prevent an adversary from
degrading service for targeted applications. Following other
work, incentives can be aligned by having compute miners
make security deposits before they are assigned to a task.
C. Extended Protocol
An extended protocol with performance optimizations is
specified in Fig. 11, using the enclave program in Fig. 12
as a subroutine.
ProtfullEkiden({Pi}i∈[N])
1 : Clients Pi:
2 : Initialize: (sski, spki)←$Σ.KGen(1λ), (eski, epki)←$AE.KGen(1λ)
3 : On input (“create”,Contract) from environment Z:
4 : cid := create(Contract)
5 : assert cid has been stored on Fblockchain
6 : output (“receipt”, cid)
7 : On input (“request”, cid, inp, eid) from environment Z:
8 : obtains pkincid from Fblockchain
9 : let inpct := AE.Enc(pkincid, inp)
10 : σPi := Sig(sski, (cid, inpct))
11 : (∆stct, outpct, σ) := query(cid, inpct, σPi )
12 : parse σ as (σTEE, hinp, hold, houtp, spki)
13 : assert σ verifies
14 : assert ∃n s.t. hninp = H(inpct)
15 : o := claim-output(cid,∆stct, outpct, σ, epki)
16 : // if the previous state has been used by a parallel query
17 : if o = ⊥ then: jump to the beginning of this call
18 : parse o as (outp′ct, σTEE)
19 : assert ΣTEE.Vf(pkTEE, σTEE, outp
′
ct) // pkTEE := Gatt.getpk()
20 : output AE.Dec(eski, outp′ct)
21 : On receive (“commit batch”, cid, eid) from A:
22 : // optimistically commit a batch without providing state
23 : send (eid, “resume”, (“commit batch”, cid,⊥)) to Gatt
24 : if receive (“cache miss”) from Gatt then
25 : send (“read”, cid) to Fblockchain
26 : receive val from Fblockchain
27 : send (eid, “resume”, (“commit batch”, cid, val)) to Gatt
28 : On receive (“read”, cid) from environment Z:
29 : send (“read”, cid) to Fblockchain
30 : receive val from Fblockchain and return val
31 : Compute Node Subroutines (called by Pi):
32 : On input create(Contract):
33 : send (“install”, ̂Contract) to Gatt, wait for eid
34 : send (eid, “resume”, (“create”)) to Gatt
35 : wait for ((Contract, cid, st0, pkincid), σTEE) from Gatt
36 : send (“write”, cid, (Contract, cid, st0, pkincid)) to Fblockchain
37 : receive (“receipt”, cid) from Fblockchain and return
38 : On input query(cid, inpct, σPi ):
39 : send (“read”, cid) to Fblockchain and wait for stct
40 : send (eid, “resume”, (“request”, cid, inpct, σPi , stct)) to Gatt
41 : receive ((hinp, hold,∆stct, houtp, spki), σTEE, outpct) from Gatt
42 : let σ := (σTEE, hinp, hold, houtp, spki)
43 : return (∆stct, outpct, σ)
44 : On input claim-output(cid,∆stct, outpct, σ, epki):
45 : send (“write”, cid, (∆stct, σ)) to Fblockchain
46 : if receive (“reject”, cid) from Fblockchain: return ⊥
47 : send (eid, “resume”, (“claim output”,∆stct, outpct, σ, epki)) to Gatt
48 : receive (“output”, outpct, σTEE) from Gattor abort
49 : return (outpct, σTEE)
50 :
Fig. 11. Enhanced Ekiden Protocol. diff(·, ·) is a function that takes in two
states and output the difference.
Enclave program ̂Contract
1 : Local state: Cache := ∅,Batch := ∅
2 : On input (“create”)
3 : cid := H(Contract)
4 : (pkincid, sk
in
cid) := keyManager(“input key”)
5 : kstatecid := keyManager(“state key”)
6 : st0 := SE.Enc(kstatecid ,~0)
7 : Cache[cid] = st0 // cache state locally
8 : return (Contract, cid, st0, pkincid)
9 : On input (“request”, cid, inpct, σPi , stct) from P :
10 : assert Σ.Vf(spki, σPi , (cid, inpct))
11 : add (inpct, spki) to Batch[cid]
12 : On input (“commit batch”, cid, inp):
13 : make a local copy of Batch and parse it as
{
(inpct
i, spki)
}
i∈[N]
14 : reset the global batch: Batch = ∅
15 : // retrieve pkincid, sk
in
cid, k
state
cid from keyManager as above
16 : inpi := AE.Dec(skincid, inpcti) for i ∈ [N ]
17 : if Cache[cid] = ⊥ ∧ inp = ⊥ then :
18 : return (“cache miss”)
19 : if Cache[cid] = ⊥ then :
20 : send (“∈”, cid, inp) to Fblockchain; wait for true or abort
21 : parse inp as st0ct ‖ {∆stnct }n
22 : reconstruct latest state and store it at Cache[cid]
23 : koutcid := keyManager(“output key”)
24 : let st[0] = Cache[cid]
25 : for i = 1 . . . N :
26 : st[i], outp[i] = Contract(st[i− 1], inpi, pki)
27 : outpct[i] = SE.Enc(koutcid, outp[i])
28 : Cache[cid] = st[N ] // cache the latest state
29 : ∆st := diff(st[N ], st[0])
30 : hinp :=:= H(inpct[1]) ‖ · · · ‖ H(inpct[N ])
31 : hold := H(st[0])
32 : houtp := H(outpct[1]) ‖ · · · ‖ H(outpct[N ])
33 : ∆stct := SE.Enc(kstatecid ,∆st)
34 : outpct := outpct[1] ‖ · · · ‖ outpct[N ]
35 : send ((hinp, hold,∆stct, houtp, spki), outpct) to all {Pi}i∈[N]
36 : On input (“claim output”,∆stct, outpct, σ, epki):
37 : parse σ as (σTEE, hinp, hold, houtp, spki)
38 : parse houtp as h1outp ‖ · · · ‖ hnoutp
39 : assert ∃n s.t. hnoutp = H(outpct)
40 : send (“∈”, cid, (∆stct, σ)) to Fblockchain
41 : receive true from Fblockchain
42 : koutcid := keyManager(“output key”)
43 : outp := SE.Dec(koutcid, outpct)
44 : return (“output”,AE.Enc(epki, outp)) // reveal the output
Fig. 12. The enclave program used by the enhanced Ekiden Protocol.
